This paper uses data from elections to the Spanish Senate to investigate whether political parties give female candidates an equal chance. In an electoral system where last name order determines order in the ballot and thus votes, we …nd that parties strategically nominate female candidates according to their last name. In constituencies where candidates from the same party compete for one seat, parties nominate women whose last name is relatively more towards the end of the alphabet; thus female candidates are less likely to get elected. In constituencies where all candidates from the same party are expected to get elected, parties nominate women whose last name is more towards the beginning of the alphabet, perhaps for positive media treatment.
Introduction
There exists widespread concern for the low participation of women in politics worldwide. In 2007, a woman headed the government in only seven countries. 1 Similarly, in 2008 there were only four countries with at least 40% of female parliamentarians. 2 In that same year, in the United States, a mere 17% of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate were female, while the Spanish House of Representatives (Congreso) had 36% of female members; the …gure was 28% for the Senate (Senado).
Economists have distinguished between two potential demand-side explanations for the lack of female legislators. One possibility is that voters are biased against female candidates, and thus female candidates are less likely to get elected. Another possibility is that political parties favor male party members, either by nominating relatively fewer female candidates, or by nominating female candidates to constituencies or positions in the party list where they are less likely to get elected. 3 Elections to the Spanish Senate, where voters vote for individual candidates, provide an ideal setting to study these two issues. 4 This paper uses data on Senate elections held in Spain since 1996 to investigate parties' nominating strategies. We …nd that parties do not give female candidates an equal chance of being elected. Parties nominate relatively few female party members in constituencies where they expect to obtain relatively more seats. Moreover, in an electoral system where last name order determines order in the ballot and thus votes, we …nd that parties strategically nominate female candidates according to their last name. In constituencies where candidates from the same party compete for one seat, parties nominate women whose last name is relatively more towards the end of the alphabet; thus female candidates are less likely to get elected. In constituencies where all candidates from the same party are expected to get elected, parties nominate women whose last name is more towards the beginning of the alphabet, perhaps for positive media treatment. In turn, a number of female party members whose last names make them "inappropriate" for Senate lists are being nominated to House lists. Our results suggest that parties, in an e¤ort to embellish their gender statistics, use female candidates as pawns-in that they are nominated to either Senate or House lists, or not nominated at all, according to how their presence in the list a¤ects male candidates.
We …nd that the strategic nomination of female candidates is stronger in the absence of political competition. In settled races, where there is no uncertainty about the number of seats that each party will get, parties strongly nominate female candidates in a strategic way. In unsettled races however, where there is some degree of uncertainty about the number of seats that each party will obtain, the strategic nomination of female candidates is weaker.
We also …nd that parties' preference for male party members is not justi…ed in a potentially lower ability of female candidates to attract votes: we …nd that, as opposed to conventional wisdom (and recent work for other countries, such as Frechette et al 2007), it is not true that female candidates get fewer votes than male candidates. Parties'behavior cannot be justi…ed in male senators'greater activity either: we …nd that, if anything, female senators tend to be more active than male senators.
Given the low number of female legislators, it is not surprising that countries are aiming e¤orts at redressing the situation. Many countries are passing legislation mandating gender quotas in candidate lists, such as France and Spain, where "parity laws" have been passed in 2000 and 2007 respectively requiring political parties to choose roughly equal numbers of men and women in candidate lists. The evidence in this paper has implications for the e¤ectiveness of such quotas. We show that, while quotas increase the number of female candidates, they have a limited e¤ect on the number of women elected. Additionally, quotas are not able to change the fact that not the best female party members are nominated: even after the Spanish "parity law" has been passed, parties are still strategically selecting women on the basis of last name.
An alternative policy option is to randomize the order of candidates in the Senate ballot. Given the results in this paper, and to the extent that parties' possibilities for strategic nomination would be eroded in such framework, randomizing the order of candidates in the party list will deliver more and better female legislators.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. Section 3 o¤ers background information on Senate elections in Spain, and Section 4 describes the data. Sections 5 and 6 turn to the empirical analysis, and Section 7 discusses policy implications. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Related literature
Our study can be connected to several strands of papers. On the one hand, our paper is connected to a large literature analyzing the low incidence of women among legislators. Among this literature, there is a wide array of papers investigating whether female legislators attract fewer votes. Frechette et al (2007) …nd evidence that, controlling on characteristics, female candidates get fewer votes than male candidates. Beaman et al (2009) evaluate the impact of India's mandated political representation of women in village councils on citizens' attitude towards women leaders and …nd that voters are biased against female candidates, but that the bias diminishes once voters get to know them. 5 Darcy and Schramm (1977) look at a number of United States House of Representatives elections from the 1970s and …nd that gender has little or no e¤ect on election outcomes. Kelley and McAllister (1984) 5 Villages were randomly selected (by law) to be "reserved for women": in the "reserved" villages, only women could be elected as village head. The paper implements "implicit association tests" developed by psychologists, as well as a measure of implicit bias towards women: the respondents listen to a speech, supposedly given by a village leader, delivered either by male or female voice, and are asked to give their opinion of it. Respondents are randomly selected to receive either the male or the female speech. The di¤erence in the ratings given by those who receive male versus female speeches is a measure of discrimination, which is then compared across reserved and unreserved villages.
…nd that voters in Australia and Britain are less likely to vote for female candidates, and that major parties are less likely to nominate women candidates.
There also exists a related literature in political science on the low representation of women in Parliaments that highlights the responsibilities of parties, and in particular of their organizational and ideological barriers. For instance, Caul (1999) examines data from 68 parties in twelve developed countries between 1975 and 1989 and …nds that parties that are more institutionalized and have a more localized level of nomination are more likely to nominate women candidates. A wealth of studies have also examined how political parties try and in ‡uence the outcome of elections by using strategic nomination. Among this, there are a number of papers that investigate strategic nomination by constituency. Frechette et al (2007) …nd that in the 2002 French National Assembly elections, female candidates were slightly more likely (albeit not statistically signi…cantly so) to be sent to 'worse' districts. In Frechette et al (2006) they also consider other potential strategic behavior by political parties, according to which parties would take into account a male bias in the population of voters. Such strategic behavior would imply that women would be nominated for sure losers and sure winners, while men would be reserved for the tight races. Their results go in that direction, but they are not statistically signi…cant at standard levels.
There is also a wide literature that investigates strategic nomination according to ballot order. Here we focus on a framework of personal voting where candidates are listed on the ballot alphabetically. Such an electoral system has been used in many countries, for example Australia, Britain, Ireland, Spain, and the United States. Many studies analyze voting patterns in this framework. In general, studies …nd that voters are more likely to vote for candidates listed at the top of the ballot; the lower the candidate's name on the ballot, the lower the candidate's chances of being elected. 6 (2004) show that in the 2000 general election female candidates were placed towards the end of the ballot, which made it more di¢ cult for them to get elected. In contrast to these papers, we consider how strategic nomination di¤ers according to candidates'chances in a given constituency-an issue that the previous literature has neglected. Furthermore, we analyze whether female candidates get fewer votes than male candidates using an instrumental variables strategy that controls for the endogeneity in the order in the ballot. Our strategy allows us to determine whether the correlation between order in the ballot 6 State Supreme Courts in the US have ruled alphabetically listing candidates in a ballot unconstitutional on the grounds that candidates higher on the ballot are known to enjoy a vote advantage. This was the case in New Hampshire in 2006, where the system was deemed to contradict Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution (Ralph L. Akins & a. v. Secretary of State, New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion, August 17, 2006) , and in California in 1975 (Alvarez et 2006) . Nowadays most American states use either randomization or rotation of candidates'names in ballots (Alvarez et 2006) . 7 A recent report by the European Commission (2009) also highlights the fact that female candidates are usually positioned in worse places on lists than male candidates: in France, despite the existence of quotas in candidate lists, in the most recent elections 84% of the candidate lists put forward by the di¤erent political parties had a man at the top. and votes that has been found in previous work is spurious, or whether it is actually capturing a causal e¤ect.
An advantage of the Spanish Senate case is that it provides us with a framework where we can analyze how much political parties take quality into account when they select candidates. Indeed, in most political systems it is not possible to estimate whether parties are selecting the best possible candidates, because rarely can we observe the pool of potential female candidates. Hence, most of the literature dealing with the lack of women in politics ignores the role of quality in candidate nomination. In contrast, here we take advantage of the fact that in the elections to the Spanish Senate, candidates are listed alphabetically, and that order in the ballot matters for election. Comparing the distribution of last names of male and female candidates with the distribution of last names in the Spanish population at large, it is possible to investigate whether a particular group of candidates has been selected based on last name. Given that, as we show in the paper, last name order is unrelated to quality, we can then discuss implications for quality. Therefore, a contribution of our paper to the literature on strategic nomination by political parties lies in the fact that we are able to discuss the strategies of parties in terms of candidates'quality and study its implications in terms of legislators' productivity.
Background
Spain is a parliamentary representative democratic constitutional monarchy as established by the Constitution, which was passed in 1978. The Monarch is the Head of State and the President of the Government is the head of government in a multi-party system. Central legislative power is vested in the Congress (Cortes Generales), which consist of two chambers, the House of Representatives (Congreso de los Diputados) and the Senate (Senado). The House and Senate serve concurrent terms that run for a maximum of four years. House and Senate elections are held simultaneously.
Senate
Currently there are 264 senators. Most of them, 208, are directly elected by voters in general elections, while 56 of them have been appointed by the 17 Spanish regions. 8 In this paper we focus on elected senators.
In general, provinces elect four senators each. 9 Each voter has three votes and votes for candidates by name (the only instance of personal voting in Spanish national elections). 10 While political parties can nominate as many candidates as positions are available, in practice this has meant that, with 8 http://www.senado.es/legis9/senadores/index.html, retrieved January 25, 2009. 9 The insular provinces (Balearic and Canary Islands) elect one, two or three senators per island, and Ceuta and Melilla elect two senators each.
1 0 In constituencies electing fewer than four senators, voters correspondingly have fewer than three votes. a few exceptions, 11 parties nominate three candidates. In practice, the usual outcome is that the three candidates who are most voted come from the same party, and that the fourth senator is the most-voted candidate in the runner-up. 12 The ballot for Senate elections shows the list of candidates running for seats, listed by political party, where the order of political parties in the ballot is randomized. Within each party list, in turn, candidates are listed in alphabetic order. In Figure 1 we display a photography of the ballot used in the Madrid province during the 2008 Senate election.
For the sake of illustration, the lists for the 
House of Representatives
The House is formed by 350 members, elected from each province for a maximum four-year term following proportional representation. 15 Seats are allocated as follows: the provinces of Ceuta and Melilla are given one seat each, and two seats are given to each of the other 50 provinces; the remaining 248 seats are then allocated proportionally according to population. For Senate candidates, the following information on personal characteristics is available. 18 First, their …rst name. In Spain, it is practically always possible to tell a person's gender by their …rst name, so we have information on the gender of candidates. In the few cases in which gender was not clear, we veri…ed this information by checking pictures of the candidates. Second, their last name. 19 We use the distribution of last names in the Spanish population to create a measure that orders last names alphabetically, and we call it last name order. We have obtained information about the distribution of last names in the Spanish population from the Census 2007. 20 We have normalized this variable to take values between zero and one. For instance, an individual whose last name is Ruiz-Gallardón 1 6 Three parties have obtained representation in the Senate in one of the last four elections in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa: the Socialist Party, the People's Party, and the Basque Nationalist Party. 1 7 For Senate elections, in Navarra the People's Party ran in a coalition with Unión del Pueblo Navarro during the period considered, while in Catalonia since 2000 the Socialist Party runs in a coalition with Iniciativa per Catalunya and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. 1 8 This information is published by the Department of the Interior. 1 9 The Spanish use two last names: the …rst is inherited from the father's paternal lineage, and the second from the mother's paternal lineage. 2 In Table 1 we display information on the observable characteristics of candidates, by gender. In general, we can reject with at least 95% of con…dence that female and male candidates are similar regarding any of these characteristics. Male candidates are almost twice as likely to be incumbents, and tend to be placed higher in the ballot. Male candidates are signi…cantly more likely to have political experience, either as mayor, regional representative, or national representative. Female candidates are more likely to have experience as town councillors than male candidates, but only for towns that are not provincial capitals.
Additional information was also available for candidates who obtained a Senate seat. This information includes a number of personal characteristics (province of birth, age, level of education, previous job, marital status, and number of children) as well as information on their activities as senators.
23 Table 2 shows information on senators, by gender. In the upper panel we display descriptive information regarding personal characteristics. In general, we can reject with at least 95% of con…dence that female and male candidates are similar regarding any of these characteristics. Male candidates are signi…cantly older, more likely to be married and have on average about twice the number of children that female candidates have.
In the middle panel of Table 2 we display descriptive information regarding senators'membership in commissions: we look at how many commissions they are in, and what is their role in the commissions. Women tend to signi…cantly participate in more commissions than men. Male senators are more likely to be presidents or speakers in commissions, but the di¤erence is not statistically di¤erent.
In the bottom panel of Table 2 we provide descriptive statistics for senators'total number of activities, and for the activities that are more represented in the Senate. First, senators'interventions, such as the number of motions senators are involved in. Motions typically ask the Government to take a certain action, and could either be (1) commission motions (moción en comisión), that is, motions proposed by the senator within a commission; (2) plenary motions (moción ante el pleno), that is, motions proposed by the senator during the plenary session; (3) motions that arise as consequence to interpellation (moción consecuencia de interpelación). Second, we consider whether senators pose questions during plenary sessions (pregunta oral pleno), within commissions (pregunta oral comisión), and whether they propose bills (proyecto de ley). Third, how often senators ask for appearances (by Government members, or other authorities) in commissions (comparecencia comisión). As shown in column (3) in Table 2 , we cannot reject that male senators and female senators are equally active in these activities.
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We have also gathered information on the gender and last name order of appointed senators and candidates to the House of Representatives. 25 In the period we consider, 1996-2008, there were a total of 144 appointed senators, out of which 28 (that is, about 19%) were women, and a total of 2180 House candidates, out of which 868 (about 40%) were women. 26 5 How do political parties select candidates?
Political candidates in Spain are usually selected by the party leaders. Formally, the provincial party committee proposes a set of candidates, and the set has then to be approved by the regional and the national central committees.
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In order to understand how parties nominate their candidates, our empirical strategy is as follows: we proceed by backwards induction and analyze, …rst, the voting stage, and then, the parties'nomination decisions.
In the voting stage, we examine how predictable the outcome of the election is ex-ante at two levels: …rst, we study whether it is possible to predict the outcome of the election based on previous electoral results; second, within each list, we look at which candidate obtains more votes.
In the nomination stage, we study how parties'nominations are a¤ected by their expectations about the electoral outcome.
Voting

How many seats does each party obtain?
As explained above, each political party nominates three candidates in each province; four senators are elected in total per province. Typically three of the elected senators are in the same party; the other senator comes from the other party.
28 2 4 We have also checked for gender di¤erences in all of the less represented senator activities (involving about forty measures) and we have not found signi…cant gender di¤erences in any of them. 2 5 The information on appointed senators is available from the Senate website (http://www.senado.es), and the information on candidates to the House of Representaties is available from the State Gazette website (Boletín O…cial del Estado, http://www.boe.es). 2 6 For consistency we have only considered candidates to the House of Representatives from the parties and provinces that were included in the Senate elections database. 2 7 For instance, in the case of the Socialist Party, the Federal Committee (based in Madrid) considers every list before …nal nomination ("El Comité Federal rati…ca las listas al Congreso y Senado", PSOE website, https://www.psoe.es/ambito/provinciadehuesca/news/index.do?action=View&id=171118, retrieved February 1, 2009). 2 8 In the period we consider only in three occasions both parties did obtain two seats each.
In some cases it is possible to forecast, based on previous elections, which party will obtain three seats. Figure 2 shows the relationship between (a) the vote advantage obtained by the leading party in the previous election, and (b) a dummy variable equal to one in the case that the leading party in the previous election wins three seats in the current election (and equal to zero otherwise). As expected, the frequency with which parties obtain three seats is greater the higher their vote advantage in the previous election. Moreover, in the period we consider, whenever a party had received 45% more votes than its competitor in the previous election, the party obtained three seats in the election.
Given this information we distinguish between two sorts of races. On the one hand, we de…ne as "settled" races those where one party had obtained 45% more votes than the other party in the previous election. On the other hand, we classify as "unsettled" any race where the vote di¤erence in the previous election was lower than 45%. 29 Based on this classi…cation we can distinguish three types of lists. Within settled races we have lists where all three candidates are expected to be elected (expected winning lists), and lists where only one candidate is expected to be elected (expected losing lists). Within unsettled races we denominate all lists unsettled lists.
In Figure 3 we show maps with party lists classi…ed according to this taxonomy. Each map represents one of the last four elections. The …gures show how in di¤erent provinces, and based on previous electoral results, either the election can be considered as already settled in favor of one party, or there exists uncertainty about the electoral outcome. The lighter color represents provinces where the left-wing was expected to win (or, equivalently, the right-wing was expected to get only one seat). This was the case, for instance, of Girona in the 2008 election. The left wing had obtained a margin larger than 45% in the previous election and, therefore, was expected to obtain three senators in the following election. The medium color represents unsettled races; here, an example would be either the Socialist Party or the People's Party in Asturias in any of the elections. The darker color represents right-wing expected winning lists (or, equivalently, left-wing expected losing lists). An example is the province of Zaragoza in the 2000 election, as the list put forward by the People's Party in the 1996 election had obtained 45% more votes than the Socialist Party.
Next we would like to see which candidate within a given list obtains more votes. This is particularly important in expected losing lists, where only one candidate gets elected.
Which candidate in the list obtains more votes?
It is well-known in political circles that the …rst candidate in the ballot tends to turn out being the most voted. 30 This fact has been widely documented by political scientists. 31 In Table 3 we examine this issue by comparing the vote ranking of candidates according to their order in the ballot. Here we have information on 312 lists (hence 936 candidacies). In a staggering 97% of cases, being at the top translated into being the most voted candidate. That is, only in 3% of cases was the candidate at the top of the ballot not the most voted. In sum, the information in Table 3 conveys the idea that in Senate elections, being listed at the top is strongly associated with being the most voted candidate.
Two potential explanations could explain the observed correlation between order in the ballot and number of votes: (1) candidates at the top get more votes due to being listed at the top of the ballot; and (2) candidates at the top get more votes because they are of higher quality. Indeed, even if order in the ballot is alphabetical, parties could potentially place their more popular candidates at the top of the ballot by selecting the other two candidates based on their last name order. 32 If this was the case, in order to estimate the causal e¤ect of order on votes it is necessary to account for the fact that the order is actually endogenous. The previous literature failed to disentangle between these two factors. Here we propose an identi…cation strategy that allows to deal with this issue: to use the last name order of candidates as an instrument for their order in the ballot. Given alphabetic listing in the ballot, a candidate's last name order plays an important role in determining her order in the ballot: an individual whose last name is Aguirre will have higher chances of being placed on the top; a candidate whose last name is Vindel might …nd it di¢ cult to land the …rst spot on the Senate list.
For last name order to be a suitable instrument, it should be the case that it only a¤ects voting through its e¤ect on list order. That would not be the case if, for instance, last name order is associated with income or education, or if individuals with a certain last name order invest more in a political career.
Regarding the latter, it should be noted that alphabetic voting is only in place in Spain for Senate elections. In all other sorts of elections (local, regional, House of Representatives) the last name order does not play any role.
In order to investigate whether last name order might be a valid instrument we test whether, conditional on order in the list, there exists any relationship between a candidate's last name order and a number of observable predetermined characteristics that could a¤ect voting. As shown in Table  4 , there is no signi…cant relationship between the last name order of candidates and their gender or political experience, as measured by whether the candidate was previously a town councillor, mayor, a House representative, or a senator. 33 Therefore, given that last name order seems to a¤ect voting only through its e¤ect on list order, it 3 2 For instance, consider the case of the Socialist Party's historic president, Ramón Rubial, running for the province of Vizcaya. Ramón Rubial was already a senator in 1982, but in 1984 the voting system was modi…ed in such a way that the order of party lists in the ballot was randomized, yet the order of candidates within the same list was alphabetic. In …rst election with the new system, in 1986, parties do not seem to have paid attention to strategic nomination based on last name, and Rubial, who was ranked second in the list of the Socialist Party for Vizcaya, did not get a seat. Instead, Manuel Fernandez, a newcomer to the political arena, who had been placed at the top of the ballot for alphabetic reasons, became senator. Since then, it became clear that, given that the party expected to get only one seat, if the party wanted to maximize Rubial's chances of becoming senator, the party should choose the other two candidates to be such that their surname order comes after Rubial's. This is in fact consistent with the evidence. In subsequent elections, it became a regularity that any candidate in the Socialist list running with Rubial had an initial no earlier in the alphabet than S. The list for the 1989 election reads: 1) Ramón Rubial, 2) Dimas Sañudo, 3) Ángel Templano; the list for the 1993 election is: 1) Ramón Rubial, 2) Tomás Tueros, 3) Víctor Manuel Urrutia; for 1996: 1) Ramón Rubial, 2) Edurne Uriarte, 3) Ricardo Villanueva.
Even though Ramón Rubial passed away in 1999, the regularity persists due to the fact that his daughter, Lentxu Rubial, is now a regular candidate for the Socialist list to the Senate: in 2000, the list was: 1) Lentxu Rubial, 2) Saray Sanz constitutes an appropriate instrument for exploring the impact of being …rst in the ballot on votes:
where F irst il is a dummy variable equal to one if candidate i running for list l is …rst in the ballot, and is instrumented using the last name order of candidate i, V otes denotes the percentage of votes that the candidate received, and l is a list …xed-e¤ect. A list is de…ned over a given year, for a given province, and for a given political party (e.g., Madrid Socialist Party 1996). List …xed-e¤ects capture any omitted variables that might be a¤ecting the votes received by all individuals running in a given list. In these regressions we cluster standard errors by list to take into account the fact that (the votes received by) candidates within the same list may not be independent observations.
In Table 5 we present results from running regression (1) . For the sake of illustration, we …rst show the OLS regression of (1) in column (1) . The OLS estimate is 1.43, meaning that being top of the list is associated with an increase of 1.43 percentage points in votes (for reference, the average percentage received by candidates in the sample is 41%). This is in line with previous literature. However, this estimate does not take into account that perhaps 'better'candidates are placed …rst.
In column (2) we show results from estimating equation (1) using candidates'last name order as an instrument for being placed …rst on the ballot. On the one hand, and as expected, results from the …rst stage (in the bottom panel of Table 5 ) show that last name order is a powerful instrument for position in the ballot. In particular, moving from the 0.25 percentile to the 0.75 percentile in the distribution of last names decreases the probability of being …rst in the list in about 70 percentage points. On the other hand, the IV coe¢ cient for …rst-in-the-ballot is estimated to be higher than the OLS coe¢ cient, 1.61 vs 1.43, suggesting that, if anything, it is 'worse'candidates (in terms of their ability to attract votes) that are actually listed at the top of the ballot.
Nomination
Political parties may face di¤erent incentives in selecting candidates depending on how many seats they expect to obtain. We can think of three di¤erent scenarios.
First, in expected winning lists the party expects all three candidates to be elected, independently of their position in the ballot. Second, there are lists where the outcome of the election is uncertain. In that case, both parties know that the …rst candidate in each of the two lists will be elected, but they are uncertain about whether their respective second and third candidates will. Third, in expected losing lists the party expects to obtain only one seat. The empirical evidence suggests that the elected candidate will be the one at the top of the ballot, whereas the candidates in second and third places will not get elected.
Now we examine, for each of the three types of lists, whether there exists any di¤erence in terms of (a) how many male and female candidates are nominated, and (b) the order in the list in which male and female candidates are placed.
In Figure 4 we explore whether the number of female candidates in a list varies according to how many candidates are expected to be elected. We observe that parties nominate relatively more female candidates in constituencies where the likelihood of being elected is relatively lower. In expected winning lists, where all candidates are expected to be elected, we …nd that an average 26% of candidates are female. For expected losing lists instead, where two out of three candidates will not get elected, this …gure is 38%. For unsettled races the …gure is somewhere in between: 33%.
In column (1) in Table 6 we regress the share of females in lists on the type of list and …nd that, as suggested by Figure 4 , women are signi…cantly less likely to be on expected winning lists than on expected losing lists. It could be argued that women are disproportionately present in expected losing lists because there were more female candidates already in the list in the previous election, in which they lost. In column (2), controlling for the share of women in lists in the previous election, women are still less likely to be on expected winning lists than on expected losing lists-therefore, it is not that lists in which there are more women tend to lose, but rather that parties nominate relatively fewer (more) women in lists where they expect to obtain relatively better (worse) results.
Now we turn to order in the ballot. First we discuss why parties may want to a¤ect order by strategically nominate candidates according to their last name, and then we examine the data.
In Figure 5 we present descriptive information on the order in the ballot by gender according to type of list. If male and female candidates are selected merely based on their quality, and therefore last name does not play any role, we would expect to …nd about a third of them in each slot. However, that is not the case. There is a striking contrast between expected losing lists, expected winning lists, and unsettled races: in expected losing lists, parties tend to place female candidates in either the second or third place, that is, those places where they will not get elected. In fact, only a meagre 6% of female candidates in these lists are at the top of the ballot. In expected winning lists, that is, in cases where all candidates listed are getting elected, the pattern reverses: women are disproportionately more likely to be placed in the …rst position (59% of them were listed at the top). Finally, unsettled races are somewhat in between: women tend to be more towards the bottom of the ballot, but much less so than in expected losing lists (about 19% of women are at the top of the list). Symmetrically, male candidates are not randomly placed across the ballot either. In the cases where a party expects to get all three seats, only 24% of male candidates are at the top of the ballot, while this …gure is 41% for unsettled races, and 50% in the case of lists where the party expects to obtain only one seat.
The gender patterns we observe in parties'nomination strategies could be due to the fact that male candidates tend to be more experienced (indeed, we have seen in Tables 1 and 2 that men and women di¤er in many respects). Nonetheless, as shown in Table 7 , even controlling for whether the candidate is an incumbent, the pattern in Figure 5 still holds true: female candidates are more likely to be at the top of the list in expected winning lists, and less likely to be at the top of the list in expected losing lists and unsettled races, but especially so in expected losing lists.
Taken together, these results suggest that political parties strategically nominate candidates by gender depending on the type of list.
Which group of candidates is chosen on the basis of last name?
We have seen that there are gender patterns in the way that candidates are placed in the ballot, and that these depend on the party's chance to win the election. Given that order in the ballot is alphabetic, this suggests that parties might be selecting candidates strategically according to their last name. This could be a¤ecting only male candidates, only female candidates, or both.
If political parties are nominating a certain group of candidates strategically based on their last name, the distribution of these candidates' last names will not be a random sample of the distribution of last names in the population at large. Therefore, by comparing the distribution of last names of male and female candidates with the distribution of last names in the overall population we can obtain information with respect to whether these candidates were nominated based on their last name (instead of their quality). For simplicity, we will compare only the mean of the di¤erent distributions. Since, by construction, our measure of last name order in the Spanish population has mean equal to 0.5, any systematic deviation from 0.5 in the distribution of male and female candidates'last names is consistent with last name based nomination. Figure 6 shows the last name order of candidates by gender and type of list. First of all, in all three cases the distribution of male candidates'last names does not di¤er from the distribution of last names in the Spanish population. In contrast, we can reject the hypothesis that the distribution of female candidates'last names is the same as that of the Spanish population. In fact, their last names di¤er according to constituency: in expected winning lists, women tend to be drawn from the beginning of the alphabet (0.29 on average). In expected losing lists, women's last names tend to be drawn from the end of the alphabet (0.70 on average). In unsettled races, the distribution of women's last names is closer to the population distribution, but the average last name order is still statistically higher than 0.50 (0.55 on average). In other words, while in expected winning lists on average the last name of female candidates is something like "Fernández", in expected losing lists the average last name is "Pardo".
The bottom line from Figure 6 is that female candidates are selected on grounds of last name, but male candidates are not. Furthermore, parties are selecting female candidates strategically in di¤erent ways. In expected winning lists, women with initials at the beginning of the alphabet are more likely to be nominated. In expected losing lists, and to a certain extent, in unsettled races, women whose last names are towards the end of the alphabet are more likely to be selected.
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The strategic nomination of female candidates based on their last names is so strong that, as shown in Table 8 , it is actually possible to predict a candidate's gender just by looking at last name order. In columns (1), (3) and (5) we simply run a regression with a female dummy as dependent variable and last name order as independent variable. In expected winning lists, candidates whose last name 3 4 An alternative supply side explanation is also feasible but does not seem plausible. Our results could potentially arise due to candidates'self-selection: it is theoretically possible that it is female candidates whose last name is towards Z (A) who are o¤ering/accepting to run for expected losing (winning) lists. However, there is no reason to think that, in losing lists, only women whose last name would place them at the bottom of the ballot (where they will not get elected) would want to become candidates. It would be even more di¢ cult to understand why the opposite might happen in winning lists (where all party candidates will get elected). is closer to Z are signi…cantly more likely to be male; in expected losing lists candidates whose last name is closer to Z are signi…cantly more likely to be female; in unsettled races this is also the case, but the association is weaker. In columns (2), (4) and (6) we then include controls such as party and year dummies and whether the candidate was an incumbent. It is still the case that last name order is signi…cantly associated with gender, depending on the type of list.
To illustrate the magnitude of the association, note that in expected winning lists, a candidate whose last name is in the …rst quartile is three times more likely to be female than a candidate whose last name is in the fourth quartile. The opposite is true for expected losing lists: a candidate whose last name is in the fourth quartile is about twice as likely to be female than a candidate whose last name is in the …rst quartile. 35 
Where are the missing female candidates?
We have found that political parties select female candidates to the Senate on the basis of their last name. It would make sense to expect that in each constituency, female party members have last names that are distributed as in the overall population in terms of their alphabetical order. This begs the question: where are the female party members whose last name did not …t in the parties'nominating strategies for the Senate?
Whatever happened to potential female candidates residing in constituencies where the party is expected to win, but whose last name is "too far" in the alphabet? Similarly, in constituencies where parties expect to obtain only one seat, whatever happened to potential female candidates with last names towards the beginning of the alphabet? Here we examine where these other women could be. We consider two possibilities: it is possible that these women are being directly appointed to the Senate, or that they are being nominated to the House of Representatives. 36 
Appointed senators
As explained in the background section, senators are either elected by voters or directly appointed by one of the 17 regional Parliaments. In 2008, out of 264 senators, 208 were elected and 56 were appointed. It might be possible that female party members whose last name makes them "inappropriate" for inclusion in their party's Senate list end up directly appointed as senators. Here we test this hypothesis.
The number of female appointed senators is very low. In the four terms we consider in this paper, only 18% of appointed senators were female (37 out of a total of 207 appointed senators). This …gure is relatively small compared to the 25% of female elected senators (206 out of a total of 832 senators), suggesting that political parties have in general not accommodated in appointed seats the female party members who were excluded from Senate electoral lists. 37 In Table 9 we analyze whether there exists any relationship between parties'nominations strategies in Senate elections and parties'direct appointments to the Senate. Results in column (1) suggest that in constituencies where parties had a large vote advantage (disadvantage) in the previous election, parties tend to nominate to the Senate female candidates whose last name is more towards the beginning (end) of the alphabet. In quantitative terms, a variation of one standard deviation in the vote advantage obtained by a party (0.49) is associated with the party nominating female candidates whose last name is 13 percentiles relatively more towards the end of the alphabet. There is no relationship whatsoever between the last name of male candidates and electoral results (column (2)). In column (3) we analyze the case of appointed female senators. Contrary to the previous case, we …nd that political parties are more likely to appoint a woman with a last name towards the end of the alphabet whenever their vote advantage in the region was relatively higher. However, given the low number of female appointed senators, we cannot reject that the e¤ect is statistically di¤erent from zero. We also perform a similar analysis for male appointed senators (columns (4)). Again, in the case of men we do not observe any signi…cant relationship between vote advantage in the previous election and last name order.
Candidates to the House
Elections to the House and to the Senate are held simultaneously. It is possible that the female party members whose last name is not appropriate for the Senate list are, instead, allocated to House lists. For instance, consider a female party leader located in a constituency where her party is expected to obtain only one Senate seat. If her last name is at the beginning of the alphabet, including her in the Senate list implies that she will be at the top of the ballot; therefore she would get elected but the other two (male) party candidates would not. However, if the party wishes to nominate her, yet at the same time the party prefers some other candidate to obtain the Senate seat, that might be achieved by including her in the House list-where order in the ballot is determined by the party and lists are closed. In other words, the female candidates who are missing from Senate lists might actually be running for House seats.
In columns (5) and (6) in Table 9 we regress the last name order of House candidates, by gender, on the vote advantage in the previous election. Column (5) shows that in constituencies where the vote advantage was larger, parties tend to nominate to the House women whose last name is relatively more towards the end of the alphabet. This e¤ect is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. As shown in column (6) , no such e¤ect exists for male candidates.
Given that last name order does no play any role in House lists, this …nding suggests that parties' nomination strategies in the Senate are also in ‡uencing nominations to the House. The size of the e¤ect is four times bigger in the case of Senate lists, suggesting that approximately one out of every four female candidates not included in the Senate list for last name reasons is instead included in the House list.
6 Why are political parties nominating women strategically?
We have found that political parties nominate female candidates strategically. Our results can be summarized in three …ndings. First, parties tend to nominate relatively fewer female candidates in constituencies where they expect to obtain relatively more seats. Second, parties select female candidates to the Senate based on their last name. When a party expects to get few votes, and hence only one seat at the Senate, the party nominates a female party member with a last name that will place her at the bottom of the ballot. As a result, the female candidate will not get elected. When a party expects to get many votes, and therefore every candidate in the party list will get a Senate seat (and order in the ballot does not matter), the party nominates a female party member with a last name that will place her at the top of the list. Third, we also observe that a few female party members whose last name was not "appropriate"in terms of the parties'nomination strategies to the Senate are included in the House list. These …ndings suggest that (i) parties prefer men to get elected and (ii) parties also value having a few women in lists, in particular at the top of a winning list. We investigate both issues in what follows.
Why do political parties prefer male party members to get elected?
We propose three potential explanations: (1) female candidates are less popular amongst party voters; (2) female candidates are less active as senators; (3) parties discriminate in favor of male party members.
Are female candidates less popular amongst party voters?
If male candidates are more popular amongst party voters than female candidates, that could explain why parties are favoring male candidates in lists. We test whether, given the number of votes received by a given party in a given constituency, the female candidates in the list are attracting fewer votes than the male candidates.
We look into this issue by running regression (1), now including a female dummy:
In the top panel in Table 10 we show the results from running regression (2) . As before, taking into account the endogeneity of order in the ballot by instrumenting with last name order is important. While, as reported in Table 1 , the number of votes obtained by female candidates is slightly lower (male candidates obtain on average 41% of votes, and the corresponding …gure for female candidates is 40%), once we consider that women tend to be placed in particular positions in the list, we …nd that they are actually more successful candidates than men. In particular, in the four elections included in our sample women attract on average 0.15 percentage points more votes than men (column (1)). This gender e¤ect exhibits a clear time pattern. While in 1996 there was a small, non signi…cant male premium (column (2)), since 2000 we observe an increasing female premium that by the year 2008 has become signi…cantly positive at the 5% level (columns (3) to (5)).
Note that this preference for female candidates among voters is relatively small compared to the e¤ect of the order advantage and rarely manages to overcome it. In the 2008 elections, only in one case did the candidate at the top of the ballot receive fewer votes than the second in the ballot. This was the case in Salamanca, where the second listed candidate, Josefa Mena, a female candidate, obtained more votes than Emilio Melero, the (male) local party leader for the Socialist party, who was at the top of the ballot. Melero resigned after the election.
Are women less active as senators?
Another possibility is that parties prefer male members to get elected because they expect male members to be more productive in the Senate. Here we use a number of measures of senator activity in order to investigate if male senators are more active than female senators.
First, we consider senators'membership in commissions: we look at how many commissions they are in, and at their role in commissions. Note that given that the composition of commissions also represents party agreements, such agreements could also be determining the gender composition of commissions to a certain extent. As shown in the mid panel of Table 2 , women tend to signi…cantly participate in more commissions than men. The median female senator participates in …ve commissions, while the median male senator participates only in four. Male senators are more likely to be president or speaker in commissions, but the di¤erence is not statistically di¤erent. Second, we compare male and female senators'performance in a number of senatorial activities. We do not observe any signi…cant di¤erence across genders in any case (Table 2 , lower panel).
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In Table 11 we analyze whether there exists any gender di¤erence in the number of commissions in which senators are members, now controlling for a number of personal characteristics. Female senators are signi…cantly more likely to be in commissions (column (1)), even after controlling for individual characteristics such as age and whether they were senators in the previous term (column (2) ). In columns (4) and (5) the dependent variable is the total number of interventions. Female senators tend to intervene less than male senators, but the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant.
As seen above, nomination data suggest that in many occasions parties choose female candidates based on their last name. One might expect that whenever parties were relatively more restricted in terms of the pool of female a¢ liates to choose from, the quality of selected candidates would tend to be relatively lower. In order to deal with this issue we create a variable called constraint which takes as value the last name order of the …rst candidate in the ballot. The idea is that when the preferred candidate's last name was relatively more towards the end of the alphabet, that might have constrained relatively more the party's options. Results from including constraint in our analysis are shown in columns (3) and (6) of Table 11 , where we restrict the sample to the candidates that ran in unsettled races and therefore might have been a¤ected by the constraint. As expected, female senators who were elected in constituencies where parties were relatively less constrained are more productive, even though the e¤ect is only marginally signi…cant (column (6)). Note also that, while the (unconditional) performance of female senators is slightly poorer (…rst row in column (3)), once this selection bias is taken into account the number of interventions of female senators is actually larger (…rst row in column (6)).
The bottom line from our evidence is that while our measures cannot control for the quality of interventions, the quantitative information suggests that female senators are at least as active as male senators.
Do political parties discriminate in favor of male party members?
The fact that parties favor male party members can neither be explained by male candidates'larger ability to attract votes, nor by higher activity in the Senate: we have found female candidates to perform at least as well at both. A third possibility is that parties have a preference for male party members, in other words, perhaps parties 'taste'discriminate positively in favor of male party members. If that is the case, one might expect that parties will discriminate more or less depending on the degree of (political) competition they face (Becker 1957) . As the classic model of taste discrimination predicts, in a situation where there is competition across …rms it is not possible for discrimination to persist in the long run. Nevertheless, taste discrimination might persist over time whenever there is no political competition, as in that case it is less costly for parties to discriminate.
In fact, our …ndings are consistent with a situation whereby political parties taste discriminate, particularly in the absence of competition. In settled races, where the outcome of the election is known beforehand, parties clearly select female candidates based on their last names. However, in unsettled races, female candidate quality seems to play a larger role: the distribution of their last names is much closer to the distribution of last names in the population.
Why do parties place women at the top in winning lists?
We have found that parties prefer male candidates being elected. At the same time, in constituencies in which all party candidates are expected to be elected, political parties tend to select women whose last name is towards the beginning of the alphabet; that way these women are placed at the top of the ballot. Given that in these lists order in the ballot does not a¤ect election, restricting the pool among which female candidates are chosen limits the available talent in the pool.
This strategic selection of female candidates might seem puzzling. Why would parties want to have a woman at the top of the Senate list in these constituencies? Here we propose two potential explanations. First, it might be a decision taken at the national level. In particular, parties might prefer to have a few Senate lists headed by women for the sake of media treatment. Indeed, in every election the media pays attention to the number of constituencies where a female candidate is placed at the top of the ballot in candidate lists to the House and to the Senate. Consequently, parties receive positive or negative media treatment according to how many women are placed at the top of the list.
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A potential explanation could be that parties have a preference for having gender parity at the top of the lists, that is, for having, out of the two heads of lists (Senate and House), one woman and one man. This could be for either of two reasons: to attract more votes, or because of pressure from female a¢ liates. Nominating a female candidate at the top of the Senate list in winning constituencies makes it possible to have a female heading one of the two lists, and it has no negative e¤ect on the election chances of the male candidates.
If the above hypothesis is correct, we should …nd a woman at the top of the Senate ballot more often when the House list is headed by a male candidate than when it is headed by a female candidate. The descriptive evidence in Table 12 is consistent with this idea: female candidates are more likely to head the Senate list in expected winning constituencies than in expected losing constituencies (47% vs. 7%); the opposite is true in House lists: women are more likely to head the House list in expected losing constituencies than in expected winning constituencies (30% vs 23%). In Table 13 we formally test the hypothesis. We regress the probability that a female heads the House list on whether a female heads the Senate ballot, and controls. In column (1) we present cross-sectional evidence consistent with a negative correlation; in column (2) we present …xed-e¤ects evidence. Results suggest that placing a female at the top of the Senate (House) list is positively associated with having a male leading the House (Senate) list. In sum, there seems to exist some substitution between women at the top in Senate lists and House lists in settled constituencies.
Discussion
We have found empirical evidence that is consistent with the view that, while political parties value the presence of women in lists, they are not o¤ering them an equal chance to get elected. This happens in two ways. One, quantitative: parties nominate fewer female candidates in expected winning lists; two, qualitative: parties nominate not the best female party members, but rather female party members whose last names …ts within the parties' nomination strategy. The discrimination we observe is stronger in the absence of competition (settled races) and diminishes in the face of competition from other political parties (unsettled races).
Here we would like to consider policy options that might help reducing this problem. We consider two policy options. The …rst policy option is the use of quotas. Indeed, quotas are already in use in Spain, both voluntary (set by parties), 40 and legislative (set by law). Regarding the latter, the Equality Law was passed in Spain in 2007 mandating at least a third of women in every Senate candidate list. As shown in Figure 7 , in the 2008 elections there has been an increase in the number of female candidates in winning and in unsettled candidacies. We observe a slight decline in losing candidacies, where the female share was already above the one third threshold. On aggregate the Equality Law has lead to an increase in the share of female candidates from 30% in 2004 up to 38% in 2008. However, we observe that political parties still select female candidates taking into account how their nomination a¤ects the chances of success of male candidates. As shown in Figure 9 , last name, not quality only, seems to determine the nomination of female candidates. As a result, in the main parties the success rates of female candidates is still way below the success rate of male candidates. While in 2008 69% of male candidates in the main parties got elected, only 51% of female candidates obtained a seat in the Senate (see Figure 10) . 41 In sum, quotas have limited e¤ects on the number of female senators, and they do not guarantee that parties nominate the best female candidates.
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The second policy option is reforming the ballot in use for Senate elections. The evidence in this paper has shown that, since last name determines order in the ballot, parties strategically select female candidates on grounds of last name. This policy has negative e¤ects both in terms of gender parity and in terms of e¢ ciency. As shown in the last column of Table 11 , female candidates who were selected based on their last name tend to be less productive as senators. One possibility is then to scrap alphabetic listing altogether by allowing parties to decide the order of candidates in the ballot. That would erode the incentives for last name selection of female candidates that parties currently face. But it could still be the case that in settled races, parties keep selecting female candidates according to some dimension that is not directly related to quality. Moreover, allowing parties to select the order in the ballot might have the e¤ect that few women become senators: indeed, if parties want to favor male candidates, they may decide to systematically place female candidates towards the bottom of the ballot. Alternatively, the order of candidates in the same party list could be randomized, in the same way that party order is randomized. 43 Given the existing order e¤ect, this policy is likely to equalize the success rates of male and female candidates, increasing the number of female senators. On the negative side, this policy introduces a risk component in the election that many top candidates (usually male) may not be willing to take. In that sense, a potential drawback of this policy would be lower male candidate quality. However, given that now parties would have no interest in selecting females based on their last names, the average quality of female candidates might increase.
Conclusions
There exists a burgeoning literature dealing with the low incidence of women legislators. A potential explanation is the existence of party bias. Using data on Senate elections held in Spain since 1996, where voters can pick candidates out of an alphabetic list, we study how political parties select candidates.
Our main …nding is that parties do not give female candidates an equal chance of being elected.
Parties nominate relatively few female party members in constituencies where they expect to obtain relatively more seats. Moreover, parties do not nominate female candidates based on quality only: we …nd that parties strategically select female candidates considering how such nomination would a¤ect male candidates. In particular, parties nominate female party members according to last name order.
In expected losing lists, where only the candidate at the top of the ballot typically gets elected, parties select female candidates whose last name positions them at the bottom of the ballot. In expected winning lists instead, where all candidates will become senators and thus there is no competition (neither within-list nor between parties), political parties are nominating women whose last name positions them at the top of the ballot. We also …nd that this strategy is more likely in provinces where a male party member leads the House list, which suggests that parties are aiming at gender equality in heads of list, possibly to embellish gender statistics.
The selection bias we …nd here is so strong that we are actually able to predict a candidate's gender by looking at the candidate's last name and type of list. For expected winning lists, a simple calculation shows that a candidate whose last name is in the …rst quartile is three times more likely to be female than a candidate whose last name is in the fourth quartile. For expected losing lists, a candidate whose last name is in the fourth quartile is about twice as likely to be female than a candidate whose last name is in the …rst quartile.
Despite the fact that last name order does not play any role in House elections, we also observe that a number of female House candidates are selected based on their last name: when parties expect to lose by a large margin, they nominate to the House female candidates whose last names are relatively towards the beginning of the alphabet. This …nding is consistent with female party members whose last names make them "inappropriate" for Senate lists being nominated to House lists.
Our results suggest that political parties use female candidates as pawns, in that they are nominated to either Senate, or House lists, or not nominated at all, according to how their presence in the list a¤ects male candidates. We consider three potential explanations: (1) male candidates are more popular amongst voters, (2) male senators are more active, (3) political parties discriminate in favor of male candidates.
The empirical evidence in this paper rejects the hypothesis of voter bias against female candidates: once we take into account the endogeneity of the order in the ballot, female candidates actually attract more votes than male candidates. That is, if women are not as likely to be placed at the top of the ballot, this is not because they attract fewer votes-women actually attract more votes.
Regarding the second hypothesis, we do not …nd any signi…cant di¤erence between female senators' and male senators'levels of activity. Our evidence instead suggests that parties discriminate in favor of male candidates. Consistent with a taste discrimination story, we also …nd that political parties discriminate against women relatively more whenever it is less costly to do so. In settled races the strategic nomination of female candidates is the strongest. In contrast, when the electoral outcome is uncertain, the strategic nomination of female candidates is much weaker.
Spain is nowadays one of the more advanced countries in terms of gender equality policy. This seems to respond to the Spanish society's preferences: indeed, a recent poll by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas …nds that 87% of citizens either agree or strongly agree with the statement that the participation of women in institutions should be encouraged. 44 The results in this paper suggest that political parties do not share the same preferences. The current policy approach, which focuses on gender equality in candidates, fails to deliver gender equality in legislators. In an example of 'old boys' networks', it seems that parties nominate female candidates in a way that strengthens the chances of certain male party members.
One of the policy implications of our work involves the reform of the Senate ballot. At the moment, the Senate ballot lists candidates within the same party by alphabetic order. This paper shows that parties take advantage of this feature in order to favor male candidates. Randomizing the order in the ballot of candidates within the same list would increase the number of women legislators; at the same time, it would erode incentives for last name-based nomination of female candidates. Notes: columns (1) and (2) provide means, column (3) provides the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that the di¤erence between columns (1) and (2) is zero. Notes: standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. All of the dependent variables are dummy variables. *signi…cant at 10%; **signi…cant at 5%; ***signi…cant at 1%. Notes: standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes all elections. *signi…cant at 10%; **signi…cant at 5%; ***signi…cant at 1%. Notes: standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes all elections.
*signi…cant at 10%; **signi…cant at 5%; ***signi…cant at 1%. Notes: standard errors in parentheses. Signi…cant at 10%; **signi…cant at 5%; ***signi…cant at 1%. Notes: standard errors are clustered at the year and province level. All regressions include list …xed-e¤ects. In column (1), the list is represented by Year*Province*Party.
Regressions are weighted by the number of votes received by the candidate. In columns (2)-(5), it is represented by Province*Party. Last name order is the instrumental variable used for the …rst stage in the IV estimation. *signi…cant at 10%; **signi…cant at 5%; ***signi…cant at 1%. Notes: standard errors in parentheses. Constraint is equal to the last name order of the …rst candidate in the ballot. *signi…cant at 10%; **signi…cant at 5%; ***signi…cant at 1%. Notes: standard errors in parentheses. *signi…cant at 10%; **signi…cant at 5%; ***signi…cant at 1%.
